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In an address to the recent IDS Research Conference,
Jorgen Randers, Systems Dynaxnics Group MIT, provided
an interesting new angle on the 'Growth versus
Development' argument which has increasingly concerned
development specialists in recent years. The thesis
that the rate of growth of per capita G.N.P. is
an adequate indicator of progress for developing --
or indeed developed -- countries is usually challenged
on two fronts. First, it is pointed out that per
capita G.N.P. is a mere average which may hide
extreme distortions in the distribution of income.
Secondly, and more radically, it is argued that
G.N.P. alone, even if well distributed, is not
a sufficient indicator of development: something
we may loosely call 'the quality of life' should
also be included when determining policies for
development, and when assessing their impact.
Funded by the 'Club of Rome', a group of businessmen
planners and scientists, the MIT specialists have
produced a mathematical simulation model relating
population, food production, natural resource use
and 'material' economic development, all on a global
scale. Randers argues, logically enough, that since
the Earth is a finite body it cannot support indefinite
growth of any of the above factors. It is thus
worthwhile considering the physical limitations
which define the 'carrying capacity' of the planet.
This would be worthwhile anyway, but is made more
urgent by the fact that the world is now in sight
of several of these limits.
The most straightforward of these is the balance --
or lack of it -- between food production and the
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calorific requirements of the population. If present
rates of population growth continue, then even
with a doubling of the amount of land now cultivated
-- such a doubling would exhaust all potential
cultivable areas -- and a doubling of land productivity,
the MIT group calculate that the physical limit
of food production will be reached by the middle
of the next century at the latest.
These calculations make no allowance for political
or social factors which mighr delay such a quadrupling
of food production, but they are made more poignant
by the FAO Indicative World Plan for Agriculture.
This points out that in Asia the availability of
virgin land is slight compared to Africa or Latin
America, and that the cropping intensity in Asia
is already close to 100 per cent. (The average
for the less developed countries is 68 per cent).
The increase in food production which must be forthcoming
by 1985 will have to stem from massive inputs of
fertilisers, irrigation, pesticides and the new
seeds. Even in the case of irrigation one comes
up against the physical lack of water. For example,
India currently irrigates about 28 per cent of
its cultivated land; only 41 per cent of its maximum
cultivable area could be irrigated, and this figure
is a theoretical maximum.
Randers would argue, however, that there is
also a 'pollution absorption limit', and would
treat the massive inputs of fertilisers and pesticides
anticipated by FAO as at least semi-pollutants.
In the MIT model, pollution occupies a somewhat
confusing place, until one reminds oneself that
it is the extreme physical limits, rather than
mere irritation at empty beer cans on beaches,
that are the basis of the calculations. Thus the
production of energy is treated as a pollutant,
since whenever a prime source of energy, such as
petroleum or uranium, is converted into usable
work, most of the energy ultimately ends up as
heat. Randers is not one to scoff at warnings of
melting polar ice caps, and points out that man's
production of energy is approaching one per cent
of the total incoming solar radiation -- in localised
areas it is already far above that level. The one
per cent figure is not itself thermodynamically
critical, but it will produce a j degree Centigrade
rise in the global ambient temperature, and the
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fact that it is dbubling every 15 years will become
that much more apparent. At some point, energy
production will have to stabilise.
The MIT group employed a fairly straightforward
methodology. They estimated the critical limits
of such factors as food production and heat loss,
and then proceeded to run simulations of the future
through a computer. The model uses the terminology,
theories and data of 'leading professionals' in the
various fields covered. This may be a source of criticism
of the whole approach, for they have relied on conventional
wisdonis which might well be ha1lenged by others.
Again, however, Randers would argue that it is rates
of growth, particularly of population in the LDCs
and of resource consumption in the DCs, which are
the major influences which determine how quickly
the critical limits are being approached, rather
than the precise levels of, and relationships between,
the various factors. By using a computer, the group
were able to explore very quickly the effects of
a change in one or other of the variables, and the
impact which new technologies might have on the ultimate
result.
Their conclusions were startling in their simplicity.
There is absolutely no possibility of 'sustaining'
a world population of 14 billion -- an arbitrary
figure, but a logical one beyond the 7 billion we
are almost sure to have by the year 2000. More important,
there is no possibility of bringing the standard
of living of the LDCs up to that currently enjoyed
by the USA, unless the world population is reduced
from its present level of 3.6 billion. If thepooulation
is not reduced, either international maldistribution
must continue ad infiniturn, or the standard of living
of the USA, and of most of the developed world must
itself be reduced.
The precise figures and dates presented in the
study are not important, for the model only shows
in a mathematical form what must be evident to most
readers of this Bulletin -- that sometime over the
next fifty years an extremely rapid transition to
much lower rates of population growth must take place,
if not to a stationary or declining global population.
That this must take place in the developed as well
as the developing countries is not so apparent, though
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it becomes more so when one looks at the resource
consumption rates of the developed world, and the
projected demand for such resources over the next
fifty years.
How far have such apocalyptic visions affected
the activities of development agencies? USAID, having
allocated a mere $4 million for population activities
in 1967, increased this to $34 million in 1968, to
$45 million in 1969, and to $71 million in 1970.
This dramatic increase in official US Aid to curb
population growth has been complemented by increased
private efforts by such organisations as the International
Planned Parenthood Federation -- 1962 budget $325,000,
1970 budget $17 million -- and by increased allocations
of official European Aid in the same direction. In
1966 the so-called 'breakthrough' occurred in the
United Nations, when the General Assembly finally
agreed that population control was a legitimate activity
for the UN and its agencies. This led to the establishment
of the Trust Fund for Population, set up in 1967.
This surge of activity on behalf of the world's
over-fertile poor was the result of a long and uphill
struggle by, in the main, two unlikely allies. Several
Asian countries had raised the problem of their high
rates of population growth in the UN throughout the
fifties and sixties (the earliest formal proposal
was in the World Health Assembly of 1950, by the
Minister of Health for Ceylon). It was rejected by
30 votes to 1. WHO gradually came round to the idea
that it should involve itself in such problems, but
there was always concerted action by the Catholic
countries in opposition to any proposals. The Soviet
Union generally argued that population growth would
slow as and when economic development took place,
while the personal opposition of the Brazilian Director-
General, Dr. Candau, played a vital role in the Organisation's
rejection of 'active inteiention'. Over the years
the opposition of the Cath1ic countries became less
monolithic, and changes in the membership of the
UN provided greater support for the less developed
Asian countries.
At the same time, pressure groups were at work
in the developed countries, and their impact on official
policies, particularly that of the USA, provided
the vital support needed for the Asians' efforts.
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Since 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation and other
private groups have been funding research and generally
propagating the need for active government involvement
in population affairs -- both for the less developed
countries and for the poor in the developed world.
In a report prepared in 1957 for an Ad Hoc Committee
of various foundations, including Rockefeller and
the Population Council, it was stated that in the
USA, "Excessive fertility by families with meagre
resources must be recognised as one of the potent
forces in the perpetuation of slums, ill-health,
inadequate education, and even delinquency".1 But
Eisenhower totally rejected any involvement in such
activities, and though Kennedy permitted an offer
of US money to the UN for family planning activities,
he was basically cool to pleas for major action.
It was not until the White House Conference on International
Cooperation in 1965 that official US policy swung
firmly behind population control as a legitimate,
indeed major, aspect of its aid programmue and foreign
policy. Much the same process took place in many
European governments, particularly those of Britain
and Sweden. The financial results of this involvement
have been noted above.
The speed with which the population issue has
become of such major import, after a run-up reaching
back far beyond the World Health Assembly's first
refusal to even consider the matter, may be a guide
to what is likely to happen to propositions such
as those of the MIT group. A very real problem was
recognised early on by those most involved --
particularly India and Pakistan -- and by those in
the developed world who saw a threat to the stability
so necessary for the furtherance of their own interests.
(This is not to say that all the private agencies
involved are just scheming robber-barons, but that
it is the realities of economic interest which effectively
determine official policies.) At the same time, the
presentation of hard data by the statisticians has
steadily eroded the position of those who see no
wrong in an ever-expanding population, and has forced
planners and policy makers to accept a much longer-
term view as the basis for their decisions. It is
the failure of planners to see the realistic options
available which gives greatest cause for concern.
Frederick Osbourn (ed.), Population: An International
Dilem'na. Population Council, New York, 1957.
16
At the risk of presenting yet another version
of well-known population growth statistics, it is
worthwhile looking at an example of such growth in
terms of the time margins available to policy makers.
Suppose, for example, that the powers-that--be in
Indonesia (current population about 120 million)
decided that the population should be stabilised
at 240 million, and that they wanted to resort to
measures no more draconian than limiting family size
to an average of two children, they would have to
enforce such a measure within the next nine years,
so that by 1980 the net reproduction rate would be
1.00. The population would then continue to increase
until the year 2045, when it would achieve a stationary
state of 240 million. Now the prospect that such
a measure could be enforced by 1980, and remain in
force, is obviously a little slim. If we extend the
time margin to the year 2000, then with the same
conditions the stable population level is achieved
in the year 2060, with 336 million people, nearly
three times the present size. Other LDCs face, or
are failing to face, similar decisions about the
size of their populations.
These figures are based on two assumptions.
First, that the planners in our illustrative example
do consider the future population an important variable
in their development planning. Secondly, that they
are not willing to resort to any mora forceful measures
than limiting family size to two children. The important
point is that however one regards population control
programmes -- as unwarranted interference with the
libertyof the individual; as deceitful efforts to
hide the effects of the maldistribution of income;
or as conspiracies by the white to hold down the numbers
of the coloured world -- the process is already under full
steam. Because of the age distribution of the population
in most LDCs, any policy decisions taken now will
take decades to show their full effect. And all of
this begs the question as to whether governments
are aware of these facts, and if they are, whether
or not they want their populations to double or treble
in size.
The MIT group are now saying, in effect, that
a similar need for long term planning to avert a
future crisis is apparent in the developed countries.
The depletion rates of natural resources is a field
of study fraught with pitfalls, but it is sufficient,
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in this context, to say that certain resources --
most notably petroleum -- are certain to be in very
short supply in the near future -- say, fifty years.
The increased cost of essential raw materials extracted
from lower grade deposits, and the substitution either
of synthetics or of 'high technology' alternatives
(such as nuclear power) will both work to the detriment
of the LDCs. Randers' thesis is that so long as the
average individual in the USA, and to a lesser but
still extreme extent his counterpart in the other
developed countries, demands and obtains a per capita
energy consumption sorne fifteen times that of the
average individual in the LDCs, and at the same time
demands an ever-increasing material standard of living,
and the right to 2.7 children per family -- so long
as this process continues, the less developed countries
simply cannot achieve a similar standard of living.
There is just not enough to go round. And if substitute
technologies were to be effectively transferred,
the world's climate and ecology would be totally
disrupted by the waste products of an affluent population
no larger than the current 3.6 billion.
Now population statistics are one of the more
easily understood projections of the fifty year future.
The implicit assumption behind the current drive
for population control, based largely on the UN's
simple extrapolations, is that a population of, for
example, 1.4 billion for India must be 'a bad thing'
-- the full argument for an optimum population rarely
rises above this sort of level. (1.4 billion would
be the steady state population in the year 2060 if
the net reproduction rated dropped to 1.00 by the
year 2000). The work being done in that loosely defined
field of futurology gives little guide to the policy
alternatives, even in population matters, now facing
development planners. Mostly it concerns itself with
the 'post-industrial society' and its attendant social
and political problems, or with the strategic implications
of continued economic growth by Japan, China, U.S.S.R.
etc. There is little on the implications of population
growth for conflicts such as may be emerging now
between India and Pakistan. Also, most work is based
upon the methods of technological and economic forecasting,
and in both areas of research the method has tended
to determine the problem, rather than vice versa. Thus
much of the literature on scenarios of tite future is
concerned with how to control the 'problems' of developed
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societies with per capita incomes of $50,000 plus Political
action is seen only as 'impinging' usually in an aberrant
way -- on the process of growth.
What is so obviously needed in the LDCs, faced
as they are by pressing short term problems and by
great uncertainty as to their long-term situation,
is a set of 'alternative futures' which will encourage
the planner to perceive not only today's problems
in their long term light, but to consider also the
social and political measures necessary to achieve
even a limited rate of economic growth. The MIT group
are saying that a similar need for political measures
will soon be necessary in the DCs also.
Apart from the factors working within the LDCs
themselves against a more equitable distribution
of income, the aid and trade policies adopted by
the DCs also tend to have the same effect. Even in
a crisis situation, which according to Randers we
are facing right now, the short term interests of
the DCs are likely to play a paramount role. For
instance, the much-vaunted Green Revolution seems
likely to reinforce, if not actually increase, the
maldistribution of incomes in the rural sector. But
in this connection it is worth noting that during
the Indian famine of 1965-66, which preceded the
wide-scale introduction of the 'miracle crops', the
allocation of US Food for Peace supplies to India,
which had always boen done on an annual or multi-
year basis, was in this case done on a three-monthly
basis. (It continued to be annual for other countries).
Under this pressure, the Indian government liberalised
its import restrictions, gave the oil companies permission
to build their own fertiliser plants, to fix their
own price levels, to handle their own distribution,
and to maintain a higher than normal share of management
control.1 As the New York Times put it in an editorial
on April 28th, 1966: 'Call them strings, call them
conditions, or whatever one likes, India has little
choice now but to agree to many of the terms that
the United States, through the World Bank, is putting
on its aid. For India simply has nowhere else to
turn'.
Michael Tanzer, Tho Poltcal Economy of International
Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries Temple Smith, London,
1969.
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The point is this. The population explosion,
and its likely impact on the LDCs, could have been
more widely recognised as being a crucial factor
as far back as, say, 1950. At that time certain interest
groups were aware of the problem. But the conventional
wisdom of development economists, the failure of
policy makers everywhere to put a sufficiently long time
scale on their deliberations, and the still-evident
inadequacy of demographic theory to cope with the
situation peculiar to the LDCs, all combined to delay
recognition of population growth as a determinant
of both income growth per head and of development
in the wider sense. The MIT study is an important
step towards suitably long term considerations of
the population-resource equation, and comes from
a recognition of what exponential rates of increase
can really mean, namely, a change from a situation
of plenty to one of scarcity in the course of one
generation. Over the next few years we can expect
a number of increasingly sophisticated simulations
along the lines of the MIT study. More detailed analyses
of land and resource shortages, at the regional or
national rather than the global level, will produce
the same sorts of pressures for action as did the
relentless logic of the UN's population projections.
Such analyses are likely to harden rather than soften
DC attitudes towards the less developed world, particularly
as regards the 'strings and conditions' about which
the New York Times was so concerned.
The ultimate logic of Jorgen Randers' argument
is an economy characterised by a 'blessed' steady
state. 'Ultimately it would lead to an equitable
distribution of wealth throughout the world -- because
one would no longer be able to accept inequalities in
the present under the pretext that they would be
removed through future growth'.1 Bit before the government
of that Mecca of growth and progress, Australia,
starts planning its transition to the stationary
economy, it could do worse than cast a glance at
the projected population density of those islands
off its North West coast.
1
Jorgen Randers, 'The Carrying Capacity of Our Global
Environment", address before the Working Committee on Church
and Society, World Council of Churches, Nemi, Italy, June
1971.
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